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Entrenching Environmentalism:
Private Conservation Easements over Public Land
Christopher Serkint
This Article examines how local governments can use private law mechanisms to
entrench policy in ways that circumvent typical legal limitations. The Article explores in
detail a specific example of a town donating conservation easements over property it
owns to a third-party not-for-profit conservation organization to ensure that the proper-
ty would not be developed in the future. This is nearly the functional equivalent of pass-
ing an unrepealable zoning ordinance to restrict development, something existing anti-
entrenchment rules would never permit. The Article discusses the costs and benefits of
using such a device. It theorizes generally about the nature of entrenchment outside
public law, and identifies anti-entrenchment protections designed to prevent the worst
effects. It ultimately argues that eminent domain serves an important role in allowing
subsequent governments to escape the precommitments of prior governments and pro-
poses a modest modification in compensation rules to limit the extent to which conser-
vation easements can entrench conservation.
INTRODUCTION
Local governments are competitors in a nationwide race over
taxes, resources, residents, and, ultimately, property values. It is, how-
ever, a peculiar race; more like a sack race than a marathon, because
the contestants are hobbled by legal and structural constraints limiting
their freedom of movement. A local government wishing to attract
some new, high-valued use has relatively limited tools at its disposal.
Traditionally, a local government can offer to assemble land, provide
tax or financial incentives, or build supportive infrastructure. It can
also promise favorable regulatory treatment. For many potential en-
trants, this last one is the most important. Promises of permissive zon-
ing, to forebear in the future, to forego exactions, or even to maintain
restrictions in other parts of town can dramatically affect the expected
value of new development. Such promises are not only important to
developers. In selecting where to live or build, individual homeowners
are placing bets about a community's medium- to long-term prospects.
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The content of land use regulations can be a critical part of this bet, and
people may well want some measure of certainty about the future.'
Anti-entrenchment rules, however, forbid a legislature from bind-
ing the hands of future legislatures. They generally prevent local gov-
ernments from making zoning decisions unrepealable or from other-
wise locking in any particular regulatory treatment of property.2 While
this is subject to some limited modifications -development agree-
ments and zoning estoppel are the principal examples -governments
by and large are left making promises that the promisee knows cannot
be enforced. As a result, variances and rezonings that are initially
promised are sometimes later denied or revoked because the govern-
ment changes its mind, capitulates to neighbor pressure, or because of
public referenda.' Antidevelopment regulations can change, too, and
be replaced by pro-growth measures that fundamentally alter the cha-
racter of a community.
To circumvent these restrictions and respond to property owners'
demands for greater certainty, local governments have found creative
uses of private law to entrench land use decisions. My contribution to
this Symposium, then, looks in some detail at one such new tool: do-
nating conservation easements over publicly owned land to a not-for-
profit conservation organization. This approach is more effective at
ensuring the perpetual conservation of land than almost anything else
a local government could do. It also reveals a broader category of pri-
vate law entrenchment -that is, public precommitments that are en-
forceable because they rely on preexisting private law doctrines. En-
trenchment in this form is not inherently problematic and can indeed
create significant benefits. But it also threatens to create substantial
costs, primarily in the form of reduced flexibility in the future. The
conveyance of conservation easements comes with important cautio-
nary lessons because of inadequate safeguards against political mal-
functions and loss of flexibility in the future. I therefore make a mod-
est proposal. Depending on the political conditions when the conser-
vation easements were created, governments should be able to con-
demn the easements back through eminent domain and then by pay-
ing the fair market value of the development rights at the time the
1 For a thoroughgoing treatment of this claim, see generally Christopher Serkin, Local
Property Law:Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection, 107 Colum L Rev 883 (2007) (propos-
ing that local governments should have greater ability to precommit to land use regulations).
2 See Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Re-
troactivity, 1987 Am Bar Found Rsrch J 379, 384-93 (1987).
3 See Serkin, 107 Colum L Rev at 902 (cited in note 1) (describing risks of regulatory change).
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property was conserved, plus interest. This marks an appropriate com-
promise between the desire for precommitments and the need for
future flexibility.
Part I describes how one municipality has used conservation
easements to entrench its constituents' environmental goals, looks at
the pros and cons of such a strong precommitment, and suggests cha-
racteristics of the conservation easement model that make it both par-
ticularly effective and potentially troubling. Part II then provides a
more general account of private law entrenchment mechanisms, sur-
veys limits on their use, and proposes a change to governments' use of
conservation easements to mitigate its greatest risks.
I. ENTRENCHING CONSERVATION
A. An Example
The town of Marlboro, Vermont had a problem.4 A well-to-do
out-of-stater (a "flatlander" in local parlance) had bought a defunct
ski area, Hogback Mountain, and was making noises about developing
the property or selling it to someone who would. Rising insurance
costs, and the lack of dependable snowfall, had driven Hogback
Mountain out of business almost two decades earlier. During the inter-
vening years, the mountain had been acquired by successive owners
with various development plans, all of which had either been thwarted
or delayed by economic conditions or by Vermont's restrictive land use
statute, Act 250.' By 2005, however, Hogback's owner had a plan to de-
velop the property that appeared to be gaining traction.
Marlboro is a small town in Southern Vermont. To the south and
east of most of the good skiing in the region, Marlboro has been largely
spared the transformation into a resort town that has consumed some of
its proximate neighbors. Home to the Marlboro Music Festival in the
summer, and Marlboro College in the winter, it has one of the best public
elementary schools in the area and a close-knit, year-round community.
4 Disclosure: I am originally from Marlboro, Vermont and remain a part-time resident.
Much of the information in this Part is drawn from firsthand knowledge and informal conversa-
tions with friends and neighbors.
5 10 Vt Stat Ann § 6001 et seq (1970).
6 According to the 2000 census, the town's population was 978. See US Census Bureau,
Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000, online at
http://censtats.census.gov/data/VT/0605002543375.pdf (visited Nov 5, 2009). For background
information on the town, see About Marlboro, online at
http://www.marlboro.vt.us/about/marlboro (visited Nov 5,2009).
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The Hogback Mountain property encompasses nearly six hun-
dred acres of pristine woodland at the edge of town. Many locals
learned to ski there, and its expansive views of Southern Vermont are
exceptional (and advertised visibly on the state highway running
through the town). People in Marlboro therefore believed it was im-
portant to preserve the property. Moreover, the threat of a large-scale
residential development on this far western edge of town promised to
be a net loser for Marlboro financially. Increased costs in road main-
tenance and fire protection, to say nothing of the potential for an in-
creased burden on the public school, could be expensive for the town
to absorb. And, perhaps even more importantly to the town of roughly
nine hundred residents, it could mean an influx of newcomers that
might threaten the sense of community that holds the town together.
To protect the property from development, a group of concerned
citizens formed a committee to raise money to buy the property in
order to convey it to the town for conservation. They succeeded in
2008, and the property is presently owned in fee simple by a consor-
tium of so-called "conservation buyers." The next step calls for the
town to purchase the property from the conservation buyers at face
value, raising some of the money through taxes, but the bulk through
public and private grants. The conservation buyers will get their mon-
ey back, and the town will take fee simple title to the property.' But
here is where the story takes an interesting turn. Instead of simply
buying and holding the property, Marlboro's plan when it purchases
the property is to donate (or arrange for the conservation buyers to
donate) conservation easements over the property to the Vermont
Land Trust, a nonprofit group that receives and maintains conserva-
tion easements throughout the state. The underlying property will still
be owned by the town in fee simple.
The use of conservation easements by a town is at least unusual.
The principal financial benefit of conservation easements to private
owners comes from the value of the charitable contribution for federal
income tax purposes, and from a reduction in property taxes. Those tax
benefits obviously do not apply where the fee owner is the town itself.
Nor is the Vermont Land Trust paying the town anything to acquire the
conservation easements. To the contrary, the town is paying the land
7 The conservation donors' principal contribution was providing money up front to take
the property off the market immediately, and then absorbing the carrying costs of the property
until the town can buy it from them.
8 See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement
Donations-A Responsible Approach, 31 Ecology L Q 1,3-4 (2004).
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trust a substantial amount of money to establish an endowment for the
ongoing monitoring and management of the property in perpetuity.9
Marlboro does receive some financial benefit from the conserva-
tion. A number of grant-making organizations require that land be
subject to explicit conservation easements to be eligible for funding.
In other words, the conservation easements may be a prerequisite for
certain grants.
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that one of Marlboro's moti-
vations is to entrench its current conservation goals. In this regard, the
town's behavior is perfectly consistent with current residents' inter-
ests. They favor taking title to the property at some expense precisely
because of the promise that it will be perpetually conserved. That is to
say, a significant portion of the property's value to the town's residents
today is the knowledge that it will be preserved into the future. Presum-
ably, without some kind of guarantee that the property will be protected
from the vagaries of political winds, voters in town might not have been
willing to try to take title to the property in the first place.
The use of conservation easements by a local government like
Marlboro is at least potentially problematic because of the extent to
which it entrenches a particular policy agenda. By enlisting a third
party and the property device of conservation easements, Marlboro is
able to achieve indirectly what it could not through explicit legislation.
An ordinance declaring Hogback undevelopable could always be
modified or repealed.o That is to say, entrenchment through ordinary
legislation is always subject to subsequent political change. Conserva-
tion easements are not (save for eminent domain, of which more lat-
er). They therefore present more risks, but also benefits, both of which
need to be considered in detail before deciding if and when such pri-
vately enforceable public precommitments should, in fact, be permiss-
ible and binding.
9 See Jaime Cone, Money Match for Hogback Group, Brattleboro Reformer (Sept 2, 2009)
(detailing the town's efforts to raise the $1.73 million necessary for the conservation project).
10 See, for example, Reichfelderfer v Quinn, 287 US 315, 317 (1932) (refusing to enforce
apparent perpetual dedication of land for a park), cited in Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule,
Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 Yale L J 1665, 1667-68 (2002). Some states have
taken the dramatic step of entrenching conservation in their constitutions, setting aside certain
property as in the public trust. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr, The Trouble with Time: Influencing
Conservation Choices of Future Generations, 44 Nat Resources J 601,603-04 (2004).
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B. Conservation Easements as Entrenchment
Public conservation easements implicate two different and con-
tested literatures: one on legislative entrenchment, and one on private
conservation easements. Both, fundamentally, are concerned with
trading off reliance today with flexibility in the future.
Entrenchment is one of those topics that excites periodic flurries
of scholarly attention. A series of articles, starting in the 1980s,
brought the topic to the fore, highlighting its seeming intractability."
More recently, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule took up the topic
and energized a sharp back-and-forth with John Roberts and Erwin
Chermerinsky about the normative desirability of entrenchment. 2
These recent debates over entrenchment have focused on the power
of Congress to entrench, say, the death penalty, or abortion funding.
The underlying concern is the ability of voters to set policy for them-
selves, and it therefore implicates quite a fundamental issue in demo-
cratic theory. On the one hand, allowing one legislature to entrench
legislation enhances the self-determination of the earlier legislature-
it can both decide on the law and on the law's temporal scope. On the
other hand, it removes the ability of future legislatures to decide is-
sues for themselves. Entrenchment of local land use decisions presents
the same set of issues, although the nature and politics of local land
use controls may generate a different set of prescriptions.1
Of course, the entrenchment literature may have nothing to say
about Marlboro's use of conservation easements unless they are, in
11 See Eule, 1987 Am Bar Found Rsrch J at 383 (cited in note 2) (relating the policy against
entrenchment to the prohibition against retroactive enforcement of the law); Michael J. Klar-
man, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 Georgetown L J 491, 496
(1996) (identifying entrenchment issues in constitutional law and advancing an anti-
entrenchment theory of judicial review); David Dana and Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the
Shadow of Democracy, 148 U Pa L Rev 473,473-74 (1999) (discussing the possibility of govern-
ment fundraising through the sale of entrenched legislation). See also Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-
Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 Hastings Const L Q 185, 188-90
(1985) (addressing entrenchment concerns in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Con-
trol Act of 1985's attempt to impose restrictions on future legislation).
12 See Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1666 (cited in note 10) (arguing that the rule
against entrenchment should be discarded because it has no justification in the Constitution, in
political norms, or in economics); John C. Roberts and Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of
Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner & Vermeule, 91 Cal L Rev 1773, 1795-1806
(2003) (arguing that entrenchment is contrary to the democratic principle of majority self-rule).
See also generally Stewart E. Sterk, Retrenchment on Entrenchment, 71 Geo Wash L Rev 231
(2003) (responding to Posner and Vermeule).
13 These differences are considered explicitly in the text accompanying notes 33-34. Ro-
berts and Chemerinsky appear to assume that entrenchment rules would apply equally in differ-
ent political contexts. See Roberts and Chemerinsky, 91 Cal L Rev at 1776 (cited in note 12).
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fact, properly seen as a form of entrenchment. Conservation ease-
ments certainly do not fall within the common formal definition of
entrenchment, which focuses only on legislation made unalterable by
future legislatures. Quite simply, easements are not legislation; they
are a property right that can be bought, sold, leased, or otherwise
treated as property without any legislation at all." And this is precisely
their power. By relying on private law and enforcement by private
parties, the government can achieve through contracts and property
what it cannot through legislation or regulation.
Conservation easements may also look different from formal en-
trenchment if they are used to obtain grants or funds from third par-
ties. In these situations, it may appear that the private third party is
actually responsible for setting the condition and for establishing the
conservation easement. The government is simply capitulating to mar-
ket demands. So long as the government's motivation is not primarily
to tie the hands of future governments, perhaps there is no reason for
concern. This, however, proves far too much. If a government could at-
tract desirable development by entrenching the regulatory treatment of
property, say by making a zoning ordinance unrepealable, it also would
not be motivated primarily by the desire to entrench a particular regu-
lation or policy but instead by the demands of the real estate market. In
fact, such a situation would look very similar to Marlboro donating con-
servation easements to become eligible for certain grants.
Some might alternatively object that conservation easements
have nothing to do with entrenchment because they are not distinct
from routine government decisions that nevertheless affect future
choices. A municipality can sell property to anyone it chooses. This,
too, limits the choices of future governments and is therefore also en-
trenching under the capacious definition suggested here. That is true.
The important functional issue in the entrenchment literature is the
extent to which the actions by one government limit and shape the
range of options available to subsequently constituted governments.
Entrenchment, then, must be viewed on a continuum. Government ac-
tions can be more or less entrenching. While this is not the formal defi-
nition of entrenchment found in some of the most sophisticated scho-
larly discussions, the difficulty of line-drawing in this area is a strong
reason to look beyond legal categories and to the actual effect of local
14 Admittedly, conservation easements themselves are generally creatures of state law. See
Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation Easements: Promoting
Flexibility in the Future and Engaging the Public Land Use Process, 2007 Utah L Rev 1039,1044-48
(chronicling the history of conservation easements).
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precommitments." Donating conservation easements is actually one of
the strongest precommitments local governments can make.
By fragmenting ownership, and making one of the owners a con-
servation group, the government is locking in its conservation agenda
more effectively than just about any other mechanism would allow. It
is even more effective than selling or donating the property in fee.
Where the government sells property outright, the government loses
all control over it. The possibility then at least exists that the acquirer
could decide eventually to resell the property, perhaps to raise money
for some broader conservation efforts somewhere else.17 It has the un-
ilateral power to convey the property to someone who can put it to
economically beneficial use. With conservation easements, no one party
has that power. Even if the Vermont Land Trust sold the Hogback
easements, the buyer would not be able to develop the property without
the fee owner's consent. The use of conservation easements is simply
more effective at preserving the property because it unbundles rights
that would need to be reassembled in order to develop the property."
The public dedication of conservation easements is entrenching
because it serves to limit or even eliminate the ability of subsequent
governments to alter the prior government's policy judgment that the
burdened property should not be developed. In short, donating con-
servation easements over municipally owned land looks like the func-
tional equivalent of passing an unrepealable ordinance not to develop
the property. That is not to say, however, that a municipality's use of
15 Dana and Koniak adopt a similarly broad definition, 148 U Pa L Rev at 529 (cited in
note 11) (defining legislative entrenchment as "a legal hierarchy in which the will of a past legis-
lature trumps the will of a present legislature").
16 The form of the property interest may be less important than the entity to which it is
conveyed. The entrenching character of the government's action comes from the conveyance of a
property interest to a group with very little flexibility over its own use of the property. See Korn-
gold, 2007 Utah L Rev at 1063-64 (cited in note 14) (describing limits of conservation groups'
power to put conserved property to alternate use).
17 The power of a conservation group to act in this way is not entirely clear and may be
seen to violate the group's fiduciary duties to its donors. But that is at least up for grabs. See id at
1044 (noting that state law is unclear with regard to the fiduciary duties of holders of conserva-
tion easements).
18 See Michael Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 Yale L J 1163, 1165-67
(1999) (addressing the difficulty of recombining fragmented property due to transaction costs,
strategic behavior, and cognitive biases). State statutes may also limit the alienability of conser-
vation easements. See Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the
Future, 88 Va L Rev 739, 773-74 (2002), citing Cal Civ Code § 815.3 (2002). Still, even conserva-
tion easements are not indestructible. See Thompson, 44 Nat Resources J at 609 (cited in
note 10) (noting that easements in most states may be defeated if the land trust conveys them to
the owner of the underlying fee interest).
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conservation easements is necessarily inappropriate. What, then, are
the costs and benefits of entrenching conservation in this way?
C. The Costs and Benefits of Entrenching Conservation
1. Property values and the benefit of precommitments.
The ability of a local government to precommit to conservation
has obvious advantages.9 First, enforceable precommitments can in-
duce third-party reliance on property regimes in ways that enhance
property values." Just as neighbors of a state park will pay more be-
cause of the relative certainty that adjacent property will not be de-
veloped, neighbors of conserved land benefit from the immediate pos-
itive externalities of the promise of perpetual conservation. To put it
more directly, the value of conservation in the future is capitalized
into local property values.
There can be a more systemic effect, too, that goes beyond the
benefit to directly affected neighbors. Commitments to pro-growth,
conservation, or historic preservation agendas, for example, can allow
for greater sorting among communities, A la the Tiebout hypothesis, as
residents buy into municipalities that share their land use prefe-
rences." Satisfying those preferences unlocks property values.2
Of course, this kind of Tiebout-style sorting does not generally
require government policies or precommitments to be binding. Prefe-
rences for any particular mix of services and taxation-the typical
dimensions of Tieboutiean sorting-are not usually set in stone. A
town's one-time commitment to its schools can change as demograph-
ics shift, as can local property taxes, or the level of any public service.
In an ideal world, people might want to be able to select not only
based on first-order combinations of local services and taxation, but
also on second-order conditions about how binding those combina-
tions are over time. But as the range of choices becomes both more
19 For previous work endorsing greater local precommitments specifically around land use
regulations, see generally Serkin, 107 Column L Rev 883 (cited in note 1).
20 Consider Kevin E. Davis, The Demand for Immutable Contracts: Another Look at the
Law and Economics of Contract Modifications, 81 NYU L Rev 487, 500-01 (2006) (discussing
reliance benefits of precommitments in bilateral contracts).
21 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J Polit Econ 416, 417-20
(1956) (conceiving of potential residents as "consumer-voters" who shop for locations based on
their appetites for public goods such as schools, parks, and beaches). See also Marc A. Weiss, The
Rise of the Community Builders 91 (Columbia 1987) (describing industry's objection to retroac-
tive application of early California land use controls for making permitted uses unpredictable).
22 Serkin, 107 Colum L Rev at 886 (cited in note 1).
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abstract and less apparent, the real-world opportunity for sorting, and
the chances that it will unlock real value, decreases.' While the quality
of local schools is undoubtedly capitalized into property values, it is
harder to imagine that variation in the strength of precommitments to
education funding in the future would be capitalized into property
values to the same extent, or at all.
Land use decisions, and especially those affecting conservation or
preservation, may be importantly different. While a local government
can change course on education funding-a cycle with low funding and
poor schools can be followed by a new commitment of resources-
many land policies operate more like a one-way ratchet. A temporary
pro-growth agenda can stimulate an irreversible wave of development.
Once property is developed, it cannot easily be reclaimed." Once histor-
ic or environmental resources are destroyed, they cannot be brought
back. The added importance of land use precomiitments, then, comes
principally from the stickiness of land use decisions. Development can
place a heavy burden on the future, and entrenching conservation func-
tions like something of a counterweight.
There is a political economy story to tell here, as well. In the ab-
sence of entrenchment, a majority of voters today may well fear inter-
est group capture in the future. Marlboro's actions can be seen
through precisely this lens. Local voters may have good reason to wor-
ry about a developer coming along and exerting sufficient political
and economic power to force some development through the local
land use processes, despite the interests of the local majority." The
conservation easements make this much harder, if not impossible. En-
trenchment in this way can function like a developer repellant, making
even attempts to exert untoward influence less likely. It is almost like
a poison pill or shark repellant in corporate law, making the town a
less hospitable place for developers to try to influence the local politi-
cal process.
23 Id at 909.
24 This is particularly true because of the law's special solicitude for existing uses of property.
See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 NYU L Rev 1222,
1275-80 (2009) (problematizing the assumption that existing uses need to be protected).
25 See Korngold, 2007 Utah L Rev at 1055 (cited in note 14) (noting the permanence of de-
velopment activities and the corresponding need for strong preservation). But see Mahoney, 88 Va
L Rev at 764 (cited in note 18) (problematizing the notion that development is hard to reverse).
26 This concern has been used to justify states constitutionalizing conservation. See
Thompson, 44 Nat Resources J at 615 (cited in note 10).
27 Importantly, however, dead-hand poison pills have been largely rejected by the Dela-
ware courts as imposing too great a restraint on change in control. See, for example, Quickturn
Design Systems Inc v Shapiro, 721 A2d 1281, 1292 (Del 1998) (holding invalid a provision that
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2. Decreased flexibility and the costs of precommitment.
There are costs to greater certainty. Restricting the ability to de-
velop property in the future (or to promote private development of
the property in the future) naturally, and unavoidably, decreases flex-
ibility to respond to changed circumstances. That, quite frankly, is the
point of donating conservation easements. But as local conditions and
knowledge change, once-sensible conservation policies can be ren-
dered obsolete. Precommitments are, in some sense, a gamble that the
present value of the precommitment exceeds the costs that the com-
mitment imposes in the future. Even in an entirely transparent system,
free of agency costs, this seems like a questionable gamble that local
governments will occasionally get wrong. People may have a natural
tendency to discount the value of flexibility in the future.
All precommitments, in private as well as in public contexts,
present this risk, however. Governments have no monopoly on bad
judgments about the future. There is no more reason to let govern-
ments out of their bad bets than private parties if they are just the
result of guessing wrong about values in the future. But government
precommitments can be importantly different, given the possibility of
political malfunction. In fact, conveying conservation easements can
be problematic for three distinct reasons. As noted above, it can re-
flect a bad judgment about the future if the conservation easements
turn out to be much more valuable than the original voters antic-
ipated. Had they known the "true" value of the easements, voters
would not have approved conserving the land. But it can also be the
product of political malfunction, meaning either that the use of the
conservation easements did not represent the will of the majority even
at the time they were created, or that the government was able to ex-
ternalize the costs of entrenchment on others (geographically or tem-
porally). Alternatively, it can be the product of changes in policy pre-
ferences, meaning that a subsequently constituted town simply values
the conservation easements differently. With full knowledge, and 20/20
hindsight, the original voters would still have voted to conserve the
property, but the new electorate just plain disagrees.
prevented appellant corporation's new board of directors from negotiating the sale of the corpo-
ration). Thanks to Jennifer Arlen for pointing this out.
2 Cell phone contracts are arguably an example of this same dynamic. See Oren Bar-Gill
and Rebecca Stone, Pricing Misperception: Explaining Pricing Structure in the Cellular Service
Market, 23 Harv J L & Tech *1-3 (June 24, 2009), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1425046 (visited Nov 4, 2009) (arguing that
the pricing structure in cell phone contracts allows carriers to take advantage of consumers who
underestimate their future usage).
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Consider these latter concerns in order. Most straightforwardly,
there is a significant risk of a momentarily ascendant interest group
briefly capturing the legislative process and entrenching its particular
land use agenda. It may well be that Marlboro, Vermont is temporarily
dominated by a mobilized group of environmentalists and anti-growth
community preservationists who, working together, assembled a polit-
ical coalition in favor of entrenching an antidevelopment regime in
town. The temporary success of a powerful but minority conservation
lobby, say, can then bind the municipality forever, even against the less
crystallized desires of a majority of voters.9
More profoundly, too, the costs of precommitments may not be
entirely borne by the current government. On first glance, the costs
appear easy to calculate. The conservation easements have a specific
market value to the government, equivalent to the development rights
on the property, so the cost of conservation can be priced objectively.
By approving the plan, current voters have implicitly determined that
the development rights are less valuable than keeping the property un-
developed. To put numbers to it, imagine that the development rights
for Hogback Mountain have a market value of $800,000. It might seem
that voters in Marlboro are effectively spending $800,000 to perpetually
preserve the burdened property. In fact, though, the form of this "pay-
ment" makes its price far more complicated to calculate.
The opportunity costs of conservation are hard to value in part
because conservation can actually increase local property values. The
effect of conservation is to limit supply of developable property, which
in turn can increase the value of existing housing. Development rights
in these situations are less a valuable commodity, grudgingly given
away, than they are like spent nuclear fuel rods that unfortunately
cannot be destroyed but at least can be contained. This is a very tradi-
tional account of exclusionary zoning and regulatory growth controls.,
The costs of restricted supply will be borne by future entrants to the
town who will have to pay more for housing, or potentially by existing
renters or other residents who are priced out of the market." In the
typical land use process, these groups are represented partially by lo-
cal developers whose interests are at least loosely aligned with the
29 This is the familiar insight of public choice theory. See Christopher Serkin, Big Differ-
ences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 NYU L Rev 1624,
1637-44 (2006) (discussing public choice theory and citing leading sources).
30 See, for example, Lawrence Katz and Kenneth T Rosen, The Interjurisdictional Effects
of Growth Controls on Housing Prices, 30 J L & Econ 149,158-59 (1987).
31 See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls, 86 Yale L J 385,402 (1977).
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ultimate consumers of their housing. In the case of a town donating
conservation easements over its own property, however, there is no
owner seeking to develop the specific property, so future residents do
not even have a proxy in the political process. In short, a temporarily
dominant political group can externalize the costs of conservation on
unrepresented outsiders.
There is an additional concern to contend with, too. Government
officials reap the short-term rewards of their actions but will not suffer
the long-term consequences of their precommitments. In other words,
they are likely to discount the future costs of the precommitment,
perhaps dramatically so, because they will not be in office any more
when the costs of precommitments are actually felt.3
True, the benefits of conservation are also externalized on future
generations- indeed, altruism towards the future is one motivation
for conservation. But if, as is likely, the promise of perpetual conserva-
tion generates immediate benefits while the costs in the form of de-
creased flexibility are not truly felt unless and until local conditions
change, conservation easements present something of an intergenera-
tional externality.
The externality problem also implicates the final risk of entren-
chment: that the political majority may be differently constituted in
the future. That is to say, even if a government made every effort to
consider the full costs and benefits of its actions on the future, it may
ultimately select a different set of policies than the government of the
future. This is not because conditions developed differently than antic-
ipated, or because the original government discounted relevant costs
(or constituents), but because policy preferences change over time. If
it were possible to hold an intertemporal vote, with full information
available at both times, the outcomes would simply diverge. The effect
of entrenchment is to allow current preferences to trump divergent
future preferences, leading to a more subtle intergenerational conflict.
Voters considering entrenching a conservation agenda must
weigh the benefits of certainty against the costs of reduced flexibility.
In the abstract, flexibility is important for two distinct reasons: to an-
ticipate the possibility of changed preferences in existing voters, and
also to accommodate changes in political coalitions (or in the identity
of the constituents in the majority coalition). Voters today may well
value flexibility for the first reason, but actually eschew it for the
32 See, for example, Sterk, 71 Geo Wash L Rev at 244-45 (cited in note 12) (describing
intertemporal agency costs).
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second. In other words, preserving flexibility is valuable to the en-
trenching majority to protect against changes in their own preferences
in the future, but is actually costly to them to the extent it accommo-
dates electoral changes that do not reflect their steady and unchang-
ing preferences. Preventing growth shores up the political power of
the group presently in control by limiting the influx of newcomers
who might have divergent political preferences. There is reason, then,
to worry that current voters will not fully internalize the future costs
of entrenched conservation.
These externality concerns may well be fatal at the state or feder-
al level. But the story is at least more complicated at the local level.
Local precommitments around conservation are less likely to be sub-
ject to this particular political malfunction because local property val-
ues reflect, at least to some extent, both good and bad land use pre-
commitments -the former increasing property values today, the latter
decreasing them." In short, local land use regulations are capitalized
into property values, and this has important political consequences.
The political process in many small local governments is driven in
large part by homeowners united in the common goal of preserving
property values.4 William Fischel identifies these as jurisdictions pri-
marily responsive to "homevoters."" Property values in these jurisdic-
tions become quite a sensitive barometer for local decisionmaking.
Anything that affects property values today will also generate political
pressure today, even if it is the result of future costs and risks being
capitalized into present values. Local officials will, in fact, internalize
at least some of the political costs of entrenching conservation, and
cannot impose those costs only on future officials, distinguishing the
political economy of local government entrenchment (at least in ho-
mevoter jurisdictions) from that in larger governments. While this is
no bromide, it does suggest that some of the particular political risk
from entrenchment is lessened in small, local governments where
property values respond to land use precommitments.
33 For discussion of services capitalized into property values, see William Fischel, The
Homevoter Hypothesis 39-57 (Harvard 2001). See also Serkin, 107 Colum L Rev at 886 (cited in
note 1).
3 This account is articulated and defended in Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis at 72-92
(cited in note 33). See also Serkin, 81 NYU L Rev at 1648 (cited in note 29) (noting that home-
owners have a strong incentive to be politically active, since for most people the home represents
their most valuable investment).




In principle, there are three broad-brush responses to a munici-
pality's use of conservation easements. It can be wholly rejected, whol-
ly embraced, or limited by certain protections to minimize its greatest
risks. The last option is the best. The potential political malfunctions
identified in Part I make the risks of embracing unfettered entrench-
ment too high. But nor should the use of conservation easements be
wholly rejected, both because of the real benefits identified above, and
because it would be extremely difficult to prohibit. The Marlboro ex-
ample is instructive. There, the town is planning to convey the conser-
vation easements to a conservation group at the time it closes on the
property. But if Marlboro were prohibited from conveying conserva-
tion easements itself, there is nothing to prevent the current private
owners from conveying the easements themselves before transferring
the property to the town. Indeed, many of the conservation easements
over municipally owned land were conveyed by private owners before
the government took title to the property. Short of prohibiting the
government from owning such property, this would be a hard practice
to police. The better approach, then, is to permit the use of conserva-
tion easements, but subject to certain safeguards. This Part examines
what those safeguards should be.
A. Private Entrenchment Mechanisms
The use of conservation easements to entrench a particular legis-
lative agenda is part of a broader phenomenon of public entrench-
ment through private law. Governments, and local governments in
particular, have a number of ways of entering into enforceable pre-
commitments by relying on private law doctrines sounding in both
property and contract. Viewing conservation easements against this
broader backdrop makes them appear less exceptional, but also sug-
gests some protections or limitations that help to guard against their
abuse.
Contract law provides the most obvious examples of private en-
trenchment. Governments can, of course, enter into binding contracts
with third parties, say for the acquisition of goods or services. Gov-
ernment contracts can be entrenching, as the term is used here, when
they limit the range of options for differently constituted governments
36 But see Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1666 (cited in note 10) (arguing for allow-
ing greater entrenchment, going so far as to permit unrepealable legislation).
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in the future." If a legislature enters into a long-term contract with a
private group to collect parking meter fees, or the like, this may limit a
future government's ability to contract with someone else (or adopt a
different approach to parking).8 Indeed, the scholarly literature often
points to the entrenching character of contract law as an example of
permissible public precommitments." Less obviously, too, a govern-
ment can incur indebtedness, which can constrain its options in the
future even more than any bilateral contract.0 Furthermore, local gov-
ernments in some states can enter into development agreements,
which are contracts with developers promising particular regulatory
treatment in the future."
Property law provides its own forms of entrenchment, too. A local
government can sell or give away property, limiting municipal control
over previously public property. Indeed, that is occasionally the pur-
pose of the government action. A particularly interesting example is
Salazar v Buono, in which the Supreme Court recently granted certi-
orari.42 The case arose after an earlier Establishment Clause claim
against the federal government for permitting the display of a cross,
but no other religious symbols, in a war memorial in a federal park."
In response to the original suit, Congress directed the Department of
the Interior to transfer the single acre of land on which the cross was
situated to a private group, but with covenants requiring the group to
maintain the property as a war memorial." Simultaneously, Congress
37 See id at 1700-01 (noting that avoiding performance of a government contract requires
a future legislature to pay damages for breaching the contract and analogizing these costs with
the political costs of obtaining a supermajority vote to avoid an entrenchment statute). See also
Dana and Koniak, 148 U Pa L Rev at 499 (cited in note 11) ("Regulatory contracts may provide
legislators, regulators, and regulated firms with a means to entrench their shared regulatory
vision against the possibility of such political change.").
38 Chicago has made just such a deal. For a summary, see Andrew Stern, Chicago Leases
Parking Meters for $1.16 Billion, Reuters (Dec 2, 2008), online at
http://www.reuters.com/article/bondsNews/idUSNO227950220081202 (visited Nov 5,2009).
39 See, for example, Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1700 (cited in note 10).
4o See, for example, Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal
Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 Rutgers L J 907, 918 (2003) ("A central justification of
constitutional limits on debt is to offset the temptations that can cause elected officials to burden
future generations with unnecessary debt.").
41 See Serkin, 107 Colum L Rev at 903-04 (cited in note 1) (describing the features of
development agreements and maintaining that they are an unsatisfactory form of precommit-
ment due to their inflexibility and susceptibility to special interest group pressure).
42 See Buono v Kempthorne, 502 F3d 1069 (9th Cir 2007) (holding that the government can
still be in violation of the Establishment Clause even after the transfer of public land into private
hands), cert granted as Salazar v Buono, 129 S Ct 1313 (2009).
43 See Buono, 502 F3d at 1071.
44 The group was the Veterans Home of California-Barstow. See id at 1073-75.
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identified the site as a national monument, ensuring that the property
would remain in the control of the Department of the Interior, even
while transferring the property into private hands." Here, Congress
was trying to insulate the property from a court-ordered policy shift,
instead of a political change of heart by a subsequent legislature. Nev-
ertheless, it is an apt and timely illustration of a government's use of
private law to place property outside the easy reach of future govern-
ments, while still setting policy for the property into the future.
Many private law mechanisms can entrench government policies.
Contracts, debt, and property conveyances all represent government pre-
commitments that are enforceable through private law, just like conserva-
tion easements, but that do not run afoul of the constitutional prohibition
against entrenchment. Importantly, however, each of these comes with
protections and limits that curb their most serious potential for abuse. All
of these doctrines thus reflect at least some implicit recognition that pri-
vate law's power to bind governments can tie too tightly.
Protections against precommitments take one of two principal
forms. They either limit or prohibit the government's ability to enter
into the precommitment in the first place, or they provide some op-
portunity to opt out in the future. The former can be divided into subs-
tantive restrictions on the one hand, and procedural requirements on
the other." Ex post opt-outs can operate either through a property or
a liability rule.
Private law entrenchment mechanisms subject to substantive ex
ante limits include, for example, the inalienable (or reserved) powers
doctrine and the public trust doctrine, both of which constrain the
kinds of contracts governments can enter into, and the kinds of prop-
erty they are allowed to sell." Similarly, state debt limits often operate
by capping the amount of debt a local government can incur, usually
45 See id at 1074. For an interesting discussion of the case, see Nelson Tebbe, Privatizing
and Publicizing Speech, 104 Nw U L Rev Colloquy 70, 71-77 (2009) (discussing charges of "ven-
triloquism" in what appeared to be an effort on the part of Congress to do an end run around the
Establishment Clause).
46 A similar division can be found in Dana and Koniak, 148 U Pa L Rev at 485-95 (cited in
note 11) (distinguishing between procedural and substantive approaches to the enforceability of
regulatory contracts).
47 For discussion of the former, see id. See also Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legisla-
tures: Of Contracts and the Contracts Clause, 88 Colum L Rev 647, 696-98 (1988) (describing a
series of cases in which courts declined to enforce legislative agreements where there was an
attempt to contract away inalienable rights or where a new legislature had a different idea of
what was needed for the public good). For the latter, see David Callies, Custom and Public Trust:
Background Principles of State Property Law?, SE18 ALI-ABA 699, 732-37 (1999) (discussing
cases addressing the public trust doctrine).
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as a percentage of local property values. The purpose is explicitly to
prevent local governments from shifting costs to future generations.
Similarly, many state constitutions prevent state and local govern-
ments from making outright gifts to private parties.'
Even when a government is permitted to make a binding pre-
commitment, it must often follow procedures that limit the risk of po-
litical malfunction. The ability to incur debt is subject to this kind of ex
ante procedural protection. Bond election requirements, for example,
are designed to ensure some degree of political accountability before
a government can float a municipal bond." In the contract arena again,
promissory estoppel does not traditionally run against the govern-
ment. This means that individual government actors cannot inadver-
tently, or informally, bind the government to contractual obligations.
Instead, contracts are channeled more-or-less exclusively into explicit
contractual arrangements involving mutual consideration.5
Ex post property rule protection allows a government simply to
void an earlier precommitment under certain circumstances. The clas-
sic example in this regard is Charles River Bridge v Warren Bridge."
There, Massachusetts had granted what appeared to be an exclusive
charter to a company to construct the Charles River Bridge, and to
collect tolls for forty years.- Within that period, however, Massachu-
setts granted a charter to a second company to build a competing
bridge." When the original company sued, alleging breach of contract,
the Supreme Court found the contract unenforceable. 6 Or, to take
48 Clayton P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt, 13 J Contemp L Issues 365, 374 (2004)
(providing examples of state debt limits in South Dakota, Georgia, and Alabama).
49 Stewart E. Sterk and Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness:
The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 Wis L Rev 1301, 1329.
50 Ralph L. Finlayson, State Constitutional Prohibitions against Use of Financial Resources
in Aid of Private Enterprises, 1 Emerging Issues State Const L 177,182 (1988).
51 Gillette, 13 J Contemp L Issues at 372 (cited in note 48).
52 This undoubtedly oversimplifies and overstates a complex area of law involving the
Supreme Court's plurality opinion in United States v Winstar Corp, 518 US 839,843 (1996) (hold-
ing that the government was obligated to honor agreements allowing firms to use certain ac-
counting methods, despite subsequent changes in the law, and despite the governments invoca-
tion of the unmistakability doctrine), among others. See Dana and Koniak, 148 U Pa L Rev at
499 (cited in note 11) (discussing the limits on government contracting).
53 36 US 420 (1837). For a discussion, see Dana and Koniak, 148 U Pa L Rev at 487-88
(cited in note 11).
54 Id at 420.
55 Id.
56 The Court reasoned that the contract did not give an exclusive right to the first company,
a point in tension with the facts. Compare Charles River Bridge, 36 US at 548-49 (finding that
the grant of an exclusive franchise would infringe upon the rights of the community, which can
insist that the government not abandon its duty to provide public accommodations) with id at
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another example, municipalities in the nineteenth century sometimes
simply disclaimed their existing debts." When this was not possible,
some went so far as to unincorporate and then reincorporate with
their obligations wiped clean.m This is subtly but importantly different
from an ex ante prohibition that prevents the government action in
the first place. If a government tries to sell property subject to the
public trust doctrine, the sale is void ab initio. Here, ex post property
rule protection allows the government to get out of a precommitment,
but only with a subsequent legislative action.
Similarly, ex post liability rule protection allows a government, in
essence, to buy its way out of the precommitment, and often at some
reduced price. For example, government procurement contracts gener-
ally permit termination for convenience, entitling the counterparty to
recover only actual reliance damages instead of expectation damages."
Specific performance is usually unavailable against the government."
Conservation easements are subject to their own important ex ante
liability rule opt-out: eminent domain. Condemnation turns the Gor-
dian knot of perpetual conservation into a slipknot that can be loosened
with the payment of money. If Marlboro later changes its mind about
the appropriate use of Hogback Mountain, it can always condemn back
the conservation easements, reuniting full, unencumbered title to the
property (subject, of course, to satisfying the Fifth Amendment's public
use requirement, and any state constitutional or statutory require-
614-17 (Story dissenting) (arguing that, as a matter of common sense, the charter must have
granted an exclusive franchise because the bridge could not generate profit if this were not the
case, and therefore the proprietors would have had no reason to contract with the government
for the bridge).
57 Michael W. McConnell and Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U Chi L Rev 425,430-33 (1993) (describing the history
of municipal debt).
58 Alberta M. Sbragia, Debt Wish: Entrepreneurial Cities, U.S. Federalism, and Economic
Development 60 (Pittsburgh 1996) (describing the repudiation of municipal bonds and other
debt in the nineteenth century).
59 Daniel R. Fischel and Alan 0. Sykes, Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract,
1999 Am L & Econ Rev 313,354-57 (1999).
60 Richard H. Seamon, Separation of Powers and the Separate Treatment of Contract Claims
against the Federal Government for Specific Performance, 43 Vill L Rev 155, 156 (1998).
61 See Korngold, 2007 Utah L Rev at 1081-82 (cited in note 14); Nancy A. McLaughlin,
Condemning Conservation Easements: Protecting the Public Interest and Investment in Conserva-
tion, 41 UC Davis L Rev 1897,1897-1907 (2008). Conceiving of condemnation as creating liabili-
ty rule protection is hardly new. See James E. Krier and Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004
Mich St L Rev 859,873-74.
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ments).' However, the government will have to pay just compensation,
and valuing conservation easements is remarkably complex.-
There is no ready market for conservation easements." Even if
such a market were to exist, it is not at all obvious that the right valua-
tion approach in eminent domain would be keyed to the amount that
one conservation group would pay another for the right to block devel-
opment. The only sustained academic treatment of the problem advo-
cates the before-and-after (subtraction) method of valuation: if the un-
derlying property was worth $1.2 million before the easements were
conveyed, but is worth only $400,000 now, then the conservation ease-
ments must be worth $800,000." This amounts to valuing conservation
easements by the foregone development that they block. On the other
hand, a conservation easement only confers a power to veto develop-
ment, not the right to develop property. If the development rights are
worth $800,000, the right to block development is presumably worth
something less (assuming the easement holder cannot expect to capture
all the gains from trade in what amounts to a bilateral monopoly). Find-
ing the right answer to the valuation problem from a doctrinal perspec-
tive is beyond the scope of this Article. But the range of options sug-
gests some approaches to the entrenchment problem.
Valuing conservation easements at something substantially less
than the value of the development rights creates a host of problems.
Imagine, for example, that a market for conservation easements did
exist, and that they were valued, say, at 10 percent of the value of the
development rights. Conserved land, held in private hands, would then
become a likely target for government condemnation. The value of the
underlying property is significantly diminished by the existence of the
conservation easements. If the easements themselves do not make up
that lost value, then the combined value of the property plus the
easements would be worth less than the value of other comparable
62 See McLaughlin, 41 UC Davis L Rev at 1944 (cited in note 61). Legal reforms following
Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469 (2005), may actually prove to be a substantial hurdle to
the use of eminent domain. The principal risk of conservation easements is that developing the
property will turn out to be far more valuable in the future than conserving it. But it is precisely
this kind of private development that post-Kelo reforms are designed to prevent. Where eminent
domain is not available, conservation easements are an even stronger precommitment device.
63 For a discussion of compensation for regulatory takings claims, see generally Christo-
pher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw
U L Rev 677 (2005) (arguing that the adequacy of compensation should be evaluated against the
goals of the Takings Clause and that the "all or nothing" approach to compensation adopted by
the courts should be replaced with a more nuanced evaluation).
6 See McLaughlin, 41 UC Davis L Rev at 1937 n 171 (cited in note 61) (citing sources).
65 See id at 1933-60.
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but unencumbered property." This would create a perverse incentive
for governments to target conserved land for condemnation. This val-
uation method would also fundamentally undermine a government's
use of conservation easements to entrench conservation. It would
render the use of such easements counterproductive, making condem-
nation and development more likely in the future.
Valuing conservation easements by the full value of the develop-
ment rights of the property presents its own problems. As a mechanism
to limit entrenchment, condemnation is appealing precisely when the
development rights have become particularly valuable. Imagine that
Marlboro's Hogback Mountain suddenly becomes uniquely situated for
a new ski resort, or a wind farm, or some other unexpectedly valuable
use. Instead of $800,000, the development rights are suddenly worth ten
times as much, a price at which the town no longer values conservation
over development (and a price at which even the entrenching legisla-
ture might not have opted for conservation). Sure, Marlboro can con-
demn them back, but it will have to pay their fair market value at the
time of the condemnation: now $8,000,000. It is, in other words, an ex-
pensive opt-out that might undermine the government's incentive to
put the property to an alternative use.
The effect of compensation on government incentives is admit-
tedly more equivocal than the analysis so far suggests because it is not
entirely clear who will end up footing the compensation bill. If the
government is condemning the easements to facilitate development of
the property, it will presumably sell the unencumbered property to a
developer (or wind farm operator, or mining company, and so on). To
the extent that the ultimate transferee pays fair market value, the gov-
ernment will be relatively indifferent whether the development rights
are worth $8,000, $800,000, or $8,000,000. The condemnation and re-
sale will be revenue neutral. The political costs are therefore more
important than the financial ones." But if, as is likely, the political sa-
lience of any particular condemnation is at least related to the value of
6 Consider Richard A. Epstein, How to Undermine Tax Increment Financing: The Lessons
of City of Chicago v ProLogis, 77 U Chi L Rev 121, 132, 133 & n 37 (2010) (explaining that "the
value of an asset is independent of the capital structure superimposed on it").
67 And to the extent it is not-as when the government reconveys the property at a dis-
count-any loss reflects an implicit concession or inducement to a private developer that is
subject to its own, independent cost-benefit analysis.
68 See Christopher Serkin and Nelson Tebbe, Condemning Religion: RLUIPA and the
Politics of Eminent Domain, 85 Notre Dame L Rev 1, 37 (2009) (describing the political salience
of eminent domain); Thomas Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell L Rev 61, 77
(1986) (describing "due process costs" of eminent domain).
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the underlying resource and the amount of money at stake, the increased
value in the conservation easements may limit a government's appetite to
condemn them back as they become more valuable in the future.
Of course, precommitments are supposed to be hard to escape.
That is, after all, the point. Their benefits come from their ability to
induce reliance, an ability that is crippled if they are too easily shaken
off. But how binding is too binding?
B. Calibrating Conservation Easements
Just as the entrenching character of precommitments exists on a
spectrum, their enforceability is similarly diverse. The net entrenchment
effect of any government action is a function of two variables: how easy
it is to enter into, and how easy it is to get out of. The greater the proce-
dural protections ex ante, the less the need to be able to unwind them
ex post. That is, the ex post protection should be strongest when con-
cerns about the original conservation decision are at their greatest.
1. Ex ante procedural and political protections.
The risks of political malfunction, and of changes in policy prefe-
rences over time, are both significant. But they also vary with the size
and character of the local government. Where homeowners are the
dominant political force in a local government, the political feedback
from property values at least minimizes the risks of local politicians
discounting the benefits of flexibility in the future." Small local gov-
ernments - rural towns, suburbs, and the like - therefore present fewer
risks of political malfunction than large and mid-size cities.
Similarly, more stable communities are less likely to undervalue
the importance of flexibility to a differently constituted majority of
voters. Where change is in the air, and where flexibility is likely to be
undervalued by a current but changing majority, the use of conserva-
tion easements presents greater risks. Rapidly developing or transi-
tioning communities, growing outer-ring suburbs, and gentrifying cen-
ter cities, for example, are more likely to present the greatest risk of
changing policy preferences. These are the contexts in which entren-
chment is potentially most problematic.
69 See text accompanying notes 33-35.
70 For a similar suggestion vis-h-vis government contracts, see Dana and Koniak, 148 U Pa
L Rev at 517 (cited in note 11) (noting that the level of political instability at the time the con-
tract was formed will affect the terms of the contract).
362 [77:341
Entrenching Environmentalism
Finally, the greater the support for an entrenching decision, the
less likely it is the result of preferences of an unstable majority. Marl-
boro, Vermont presents an unusually easy case for judging political
support because of Vermont's somewhat anachronistic reliance on a
town meeting system for local governance. There, the plan to donate
conservation easements could, in fact, be presented to the voters en
masse and the extent of support easily gauged. This, of course, is not
always possible and political support can be difficult to assess.
When conservation easements are conveyed by a small, stable lo-
cal government after some expression of strong public support, the
risks of political malfunction are relatively low. The only substantial
risk is that the easements turn out to be more valuable than the origi-
nal government anticipated, but that risk is no different than the risk
presented by any precommitment, public or private. In these cases,
traditional condemnation rules are an adequate remedy to prevent
entrenchment that turns out to be genuinely harmful to the public.
However, where the conservation easements are conveyed by a large
or rapidly changing government, with substantial risk of minoritarian
capture, a subsequent government should be able to unwind them
more easily in the future.
2. Ex post modification to fair market value.
Surprisingly, a modest adjustment in condemnation rules in those
cases presenting the greatest risk of political malfunction might be all
that is required (assuming that courts do, in fact, follow the before-
and-after method of valuing conservation easements by the value of
foregone development costs). Under current rules for eminent do-
main, just compensation is measured by the fair market value of the
property on the date it is taken." Instead, governments should have
the choice of condemning conservation easements by paying their fair
market value at the time of the condemnation or as of the date they
were originally conveyed, plus interest.72
Under this compensation rule, governments would only be able
to entrench conservation to the extent they actually internalized those
costs at the time the conservation easements were created. This
71 Serkin, 99 Nw U L Rev at 678 (cited in note 63).
72 The just compensation standard probably contains enough flexibility for courts to meas-
ure the value of conservation easements at the date conveyed, instead of at the date of the actual
condemnation. See id at 696-99. Even if not, conservation easements are themselves largely a
creature of modem statute, and their value for these purposes could be similarly modified by
statute. See McLaughlin, 41 UC Davis L Rev at 1900 & n 5 (cited in note 61).
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creates no change at all in the current rules if the development rights
remain as valuable as they were at the time they were conveyed. That
is to say, in the absence of any real change in circumstances, the value
of the easements in the future should come close to the value of the
easements at the time they were created, plus interest." But if the con-
servation easements have become much more valuable, this proposal
in effect allows for de novo review of the original entrenchment deci-
sion. When there was a significant risk of political malfunction in the
original decision, a subsequent government can, in effect, decide for
itself whether conservation continues to be worth the price the origi-
nal government "paid" by donating the easements.
Some might object that this proposal will result in nothing more
than a wealth transfer from conservation groups to developers. If the
government can reclaim the conservation easements for substantially
less than their market value, this can result in a giveaway to the ultimate
transferee at the expense of the original easement holder. In fact,
though, there is no necessary relationship between what the govern-
ment pays in condemnation and what it charges the transferee. A gov-
ernment that acquires property on the cheap can still charge as much as
a buyer is willing to pay to acquire the property. And if the government
pays a lot to acquire property, there is no requirement that it recoup
those costs in the sale of the property." Instead of a transfer from con-
servation groups to developers, then, the proposal here simply allows
the subsequent government to allocate who benefits from any unex-
pected increase in the value of the conservation easements.
Importantly, though, the proposal provides governments with an
option-not a requirement-to condemn for the original price of the
easements. Presumably it will pick whichever is lower. This is to ac-
count for the very real possibility that the easements have decreased
in value over time. A government's conservation policies may well be
put to the test either in a boom time when development is unexpec-
73 This is not quite right because the value of the easements at T1 includes the possibility
of some increase in value, discounted by its likelihood. Where that eventuality does actually
come to pass, it does not mean that the original value was necessarily wrong, or underestimated
the actual value of the easements. Nevertheless, the easements at T2 are, in fact, more valuable if
unlikely conditions come to pass. Interest can be measured by actual inflation and interest rates
over the time period instead of by proxy. The point is to put the new government in as close to
the financial shoes of the original government as possible.
74 In Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit, 304 NW2d 455 (Mich 1981), over-
ruled on other grounds by County of Wayne v Hancock, 684 NW2d 765 (Mich 2004), Detroit
spent $200 million to condemn property that it transferred to General Motors for only $8 mil-
lion. See Daniel B. Kelly, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale
Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 Cornell L Rev 1, 37 (2006).
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tedly valuable, or in a bust when the absence of development is crip-
pling. If local property and development rights have decreased in val-
ue since property was originally conserved, valuing conservation
easements in eminent domain by their original price will be even more
entrenching than current fair market value rules. It would all but en-
sure that the government would not act; the government would have
to pay more than the easements are actually worth.
There is an additional complexity to acknowledge. This valuation
proposal is easy enough to implement when the government itself
conveys the conservation easements. But what happens if, as is often
the case, the government acquires property subject to conservation
easements that had been created some time in the past? In that case,
the easements for condemnation purposes should be valued as of the
date the government acquired the property, not the date that the con-
servation easements were originally created. This will prevent a devel-
oper from buying up conserved property and using a conveyance to
the government to erase the conservation easements on the cheap. If
the value of the development rights has increased between the time
the property was originally conserved, and the time the underlying
property was conveyed to the government, the government will have
to pay that increase if it wants to take the conservation easements by
eminent domain.
Ultimately, this approach remains something of a compromise. It
still allows for the use of conservation easements as a precommitment
device. In fact, it would be hard to know how to forbid them. But,
where the risks of political malfunction are greatest, it limits the
strength of the precommitment to the value of the easements at the
time they are conveyed (or the time the government acquires the un-
derlying property). This is hardly an invitation to eminent domain,
which will remain costly both financially and politically. Neighboring
owners can still sleep easy in the knowledge that the conserved proper-
ty will not be developed willy-nilly. But if it turns out that political mal-
function led the original government to make a particularly bad bet,
and that development rights over the property are much more valuable
than anyone guessed, the original government's precommitment cannot
deny a future government (or public) those increased benefits.
CONCLUSION
A town conveying away conservation easements to property it
owns is, indeed, unusual. It is also, however, entirely intelligible as a
private law mechanism for precommitting to an environmental or an-
ti-growth agenda. While democracy usually does not permit a legisla-
2010]1 365
The University of Chicago Law Review
ture to entrench its substantive policy judgments, there are good rea-
sons to allow local governments, in particular, to precommit to at least
some kinds of land use regulations in the future. Conservation ease-
ments are therefore a potentially valuable, if narrow, tool for inducing
local investment and unlocking property values. But they come with
risks. Predictable political malfunctions can result in significant finan-
cial harm; conservation easements can also amount to naked and
permanent exclusionary growth controls, and governments using them
may be systematically undervaluing the importance of retaining flex-
ibility in the future.
The way forward towards striking the right balance between
these costs and benefits is made easier by construing conservation
easements as part of a broader phenomenon: the use of private law to
entrench local government decisions. The concern, broadly, is deciding
when and how the decisions of one government should be able to
reach forward, as if out of the political-if not literal-grave, to con-
strain the choices available to future governments. At this level of ge-
nerality, it becomes apparent that entrenchment exists on a spectrum.
Decisions and actions by one government can be more or less en-
trenching. At one end are entirely routine service contracts. At the
other are unrepealable regulations. The former are benign. The latter
are fatally antidemocratic. The gray area in between-the area that
includes long-term contracts, bond issuances, and conservation ease-
ments, among others- implicates difficult line-drawing where the
benefits of entrenchment need to be weighed against its costs in par-
ticular contexts.
The goal for all precommitments should be to unlock their value
while minimizing the risk of political malfunction. For conservation
easements, that should mean implementing ex post protection that
varies depending on the political conditions that existed at the time
the easements were created. Where small, stable local governments
conveyed conservation easements after some expression of supermajor-
ity preferences, there is little cause for concern, and courts should en-
force those precommitments, subject only to traditional condemnation
rules. Where, however, the risks of political malfunction were higher, the
precommitment knot should be looser, and governments in the future
should be able to condemn back the conservation easements for their
value at the time they were originally conveyed. By focusing on the
extent of entrenchment, and the structural protections against political
malfunction, it is possible to endorse at least the limited use of conser-
vation easements by local governments like Marlboro, Vermont, while
suggesting limits to their long-term enforcement.
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